Automatic facial recognition and the intensification of police surveillance by Keenan, Bernard
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Keenan, Bernard (2021) Automatic facial recognition and the intensification
of police surveillance. Modern Law Review , ISSN 1468-2230. (In Press)
Downloaded from: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/43209/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
 1 
Case Comment: R (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police 
[2020] EWCA Civ 1058 
Automatic facial recognition and the intensification of police surveillance 
Word count: 4504       including footnotes: 4920 
Statement: This material is not under consideration elsewhere and has not been 
published nor is it pending publication elsewhere.  
Keywords: Facial recognition, surveillance, privacy, Article 8, policing, discrimination 
 
 
Abstract: In R (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020] 
EWCA Civ 1058 the Court of Appeal held the deployment of live automated facial 
recognition technology (AFR) by the South Wales Police Force (SWP) unlawful on 
three grounds.1 It violated the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because it lacked a suitable basis in 
law; the Data Protection Impact Assessment carried out under section 64 of the Data 
Protection Act 2018 was deficient for failing to assess the risks to the rights and 
freedoms of individuals processed by the system; and SWP failed to fulfil the Public 
Service Equality Duty (PSED) imposed by section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 by 
failing to assess whether or not the software used in the AFR system was biased in 
relation to sex and race. 
 
                                                 
* Unless otherwise stated, all URLs were last accessed 22 October 2020. 
1 R (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020] EWCA Civ 1058. 
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This is a significant case. It marks the first time the courts have considered the legality 
of AFR deployed in the service of policing. It sets important parameters for its use in 
the future. This case commentary sets out the facts and explains the Court of Appeal’s 
reasons for overturning the initial decision of the Divisional Court.2 It then discusses 
the implications of the judgment for the use of AFR technology by police and advances 




The appellant is a civil liberties campaigner living in Cardiff. His case was supported 
by Liberty, the civil liberties organisation. The respondent is the Chief Constable of 
South Wales Police (Heddlu De Cymru). The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, responsible for nationwide policing and for the development of 
technology like AFR, is an Interested Party, while the Information Commissioner and 
the Surveillance Camera Commissioner are intervenors.  
 
SWP is the leading police force in trials of AFR in the UK and has been using the 
technology since mid-2017, beginning with that year’s Champions League final at the 
Millennium Stadium in Cardiff. The trial system is called ‘AFR Locate’. The facial 
recognition software used in AFR Locate is called ‘NeoFace Watch’. It is proprietary 
software licenced from a company now called North Gate Public Services (UK) Ltd 
                                                 
2 R (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin) 
[2020] 1 WLR 672, [2020] 1 All ER 864. 
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(formerly NEC).3 The software is also used in a system called ‘AFR Identify’ to 
compare images of unknown suspects and persons of interest against images stored 
in the SWP custody database (around 500,000 faces).4 The latter system was not 
challenged in the case.   
 
AFR Locate is deployed via CCTV cameras mounted on police vehicles or on poles to 
carry out live surveillance in crowded areas. It was used around 50 times between 
May 2017 and April 2019. In that period an estimated 500,000 faces were scanned. SWP 
aimed in each deployment to scan as many individual faces as possible. The vast 
majority were of no interest to the police.  
 
The basic function of AFR Locate is explained in the judgment. First, a database of 
existing images – called the ‘watchlist’ – is compiled.   
 
The watchlist is created from images held on databases maintained by SWP as 
part of its ordinary policing activities, primarily from a database of custody 
photographs held on SWP's Niche Record Management System. The images 
selected for inclusion on a watchlist will depend on the purpose of each specific 
deployment. The watchlists used in the deployments in issue in this case have 
included (1) persons wanted on warrants, (2) individuals who are unlawfully 
at large (having escaped from lawful custody), (3) persons suspected of having 
committed crimes, (4) persons who may be in need of protection (e.g. missing 
                                                 
3 n 2 above, at [26]. 
4 ibid at [27]. 
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persons), (5) individuals whose presence at a particular event causes particular 
concern, (6) persons simply of possible interest to SWP for intelligence 
purposes and (7) vulnerable persons. To date, the watchlists used by SWP have 
comprised between 400-800 people. The maximum capacity for a watchlist is 
2,000 images but, as we understand it, this is because of the limits of the 
technology used rather than any limitation of principle.5 
 
Images selected for the watchlist on each deployment are processed in order to map 
and encode the biometric ‘facial features’ of the faces on the watchlist. Once deployed, 
the camera system generates a live visual feed, which is analysed in near-real time by 
the software. Individual faces are automatically detected and isolated as people pass 
into the field of observation. The software selects unique features from each facial 
image and encodes them as a biometric template unique to each individual. It 
compares the biometric templates generated from the crowd against the biometric 
templates generated from the watchlist. The comparison works by generating a 
‘similarity score’ between each detected face and each face on the watchlist. The higher 
the score, the more likely that there is a positive match between a person in the camera 
feed and a person on the watchlist. The operator of the system must specify a 
threshold value for similarity scores above which the software will alert the operator 
of a potential match. The lower the threshold, the greater the ‘false alarm rate’, as less 
likely matches are flagged up for human attention. The higher the threshold, the more 
likely it becomes that a true match will be missed by the operator and a potential target 
                                                 
5 n 1 above, at [13].  
 5 
escapes detection.6 Where a match was flagged up by the system the operator reviews 
the images to confirm the match and, if positive, decides on what action to take.7  
 
During the trial, all biometric templates produced from the live stream were 
immediately deleted. All data derived from faces that did not match against the 
watchlist were immediately erased. Images of matched faces were stored for 24 hours 
but the biometric template was not. The raw CCTV feed was recorded and stored for 
31 days, as per the standard CCTV retention period. Watchlist images and biometric 
data were erased from the system within 24 hours of deployment.8  
 
AFR Locate was not used covertly. SWP advertised each deployment on social media, 
placed large ‘Fair Processing Notices’ on the vehicles and in a 100-meter radius from 
the area under surveillance, and handed out postcard-sized information leaflets to 
passers-by and to everyone stopped as a result of the AFR Locate system. Nonetheless, 




Mr Bridges claimed his face was detected and processed by AFR Locate on two 
occasions, first in December 2017 in Cardiff city centre and again in March 2018 at a 
                                                 
6 ibid at [9]. 
7 ibid at [15]. 
8 ibid at [17]-[18]. 
9 ibid at [19]-[20]. 
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protest.10 Judicial review was sought on the grounds that SWP’s deployment of AFR 
Locate on these occasions was not compatible with the right to respect for private life 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, that it breached aspects of the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
1998 and the DPA 2018, and that SWP had failed to meet the PSED imposed by section 
149 of the Equality Act 2010.11 SWP could not confirm whether or not Bridges had 
indeed been scanned, but accepted that he was a victim for the purposes of section 7 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. Indeed, SWP and the Home Secretary consented to the 
application for judicial review.12 Furthermore, the latest event Mr Bridges complained 
of preceded the commencement of the DPA 2018 (25th May 2018) by two months, 
however, all parties agreed to consider the law as it now stands.13 This hypothecation 
of facts shows the utility of judicial review to the police and the Home Office, willingly 
putting their technological trial on trial before the law. 
 
On 4th September 2019 the Divisional Court dismissed the claim on all grounds. The 
Divisional Court agreed that Article 8 was engaged in respect of anyone whose face is 
scanned by AFR Locate but held that the interference with privacy was both ‘in 
accordance with the law’ and proportionate for the purposes of Article 8(2). It was in 
accordance with the law because there was a sufficient legal framework in place, 
drawing together primary legislation, secondary legislation in the form of codes of 
practice issued under primary legislation, and SWP’s local policies.14 It was 
                                                 
10 ibid at [25]. 
11 ibid at [32]-[33]. 
12 ibid at [34}. 
13 n 2 above, at [109]. 
14 n 1 above, at [43]. 
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proportionate, both in relation to any individual interference with Mr Bridges’ rights 
on the dates in question and in general systemic terms, 15  for the following reasons: 
 
AFR Locate was deployed in an open and transparent way, with significant 
public engagement. On each occasion, it was used for a limited time, and 
covered a limited footprint. It was deployed for the specific and limited 
purpose of seeking to identify particular individuals (not including the 
Claimant) who may have been in the area and whose presence was of justifiable 
interest to the police […] On neither occasion did it lead to a disproportionate 
interference with anybody’s Article 8 rights […] the interference would be 
limited to the near instantaneous processing and discarding of the Claimant’s 
biometric data. No personal information relating to the Claimant would have 
been available to any police officer, or to any human agent. No data would be 
retained. There was no attempt to identify the Claimant. He was not spoken to 
by any police officer.16   
 
With respect to the DPA 1998, the Divisional Court found that AFR Locate did process 
personal data but held that it did so lawfully and fairly in line with section 4(4) DPA 
1998.17 In respect of the DPA 2018, the Court agreed with the claimant that AFR Locate 
entails processing sensitive data for the purposes of section 35(8) as it uniquely 
identifies individuals, but found this processing lawful for three reasons. First, 
                                                 
15 ibid at [44]. 
16 n 2 above, at [101], cited in n 1 above, at [133]. 
17 n 1 above, at [47]. 
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because it is ‘strictly necessary for the law enforcement purpose’ as per section 
35(5)(a), for the same reasons that the deployment of AFR Locate was found to be 
proportionate for the purposes of Article 8; second, in line with section 35(5)(b) the 
deployment complied with the necessary conditions for lawful sensitive processing 
specified in Schedule 2, again for the reasons given in the proportionality assessment, 
as well as SWP’s common law duty to prevent and detect crime. Third, section 35(5)(c) 
requires SWP to have an appropriate Policy Document in place, compliant with the 
requirements of section 42. This particular issue was left open in anticipation of 
forthcoming guidance from the Information Commissioner.18 The Court held that the 
Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) undertaken by SWP in respect of the AFR 
Locate trial satisfied the requirements of section 64 DPA 2018.19  
 
Finally, the Divisional Court rejected the claim that SWP had failed to discharge the 
PSED imposed by section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when carrying out the relevant 
Equality Impact Assessment ahead of the trial by not considering whether or not AFR 
Locate could be indirectly discriminatory in its effect. The Court held that SWP did 
not have to consider the possibility because there was no evidence suggesting that 
NeoFace Watch software produces a higher rate of positive matches for female faces 
or for black and minority ethnic faces than for white or male faces.20  
 
Appeal  
                                                 
18 ibid at [50]. 
19 ibid at [51]. 
20 ibid at [52]. 
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Permission to appeal was granted on all five submitted grounds: 
1. That the Divisional Court erred in finding that the interference with the 
appellant’s Article 8 rights was, and is, in accordance with the law. 
2. That the Court made in an error of law in basing its proportionality assessment on 
the appellant’s individual rights alone rather than also considering the cumulative 
weight of interference with the rights of all those persons whose biometrics were 
captured by the system during its deployment. 
3. That the Court erred in its assessment of the DPIA under section 64 DPA 2018 by 
failing to factor in the engagement of Article 8, and the processing of the biometric 
personal data under the DPA, in respect of all who were processed by AFR Locate 
but not matched to watchlists.  
4. That the Court made an error of law when it declined to reach a finding as to the 
compliance of SWP’s November 2018 Policy Document with the requirements of 
section 42 DPA 2018, as the document is a condition precedent for lawful 
processing under section 35 DPA 2018. 
5. That the Equality Impact Assessment carried out by SWP was obviously 
inadequate and failed to recognise the risk of indirect discrimination, that SWP’s 
subsequent approach to the question of indirect discrimination is flawed, and that 
the Court erred in failing to appreciate that the PSED is an ongoing duty and not 
a single event.21  
 
                                                 
21 ibid at [53]. 
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In its judgment the Court of Appeal finds in favour of the appellant on the first, third 
and fifth grounds and rejects the second and fourth.  
 
In respect of the first ground, the Court of Appeal adopts the ‘relativist’ approach 
proposed by Laws LJ in a partly dissenting judgment in R (Wood) v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner when deciding on the quality of law required in order for the trial to be 
‘in accordance with the law’. 22  Put simply, this means that ‘the more intrusive the act 
complained of, the more precise and specific must be the law said to justify it’.23 This 
allows for an original assessment of the particular features of AFR Locate to be made 
by the Court of Appeal, informed by, but independent of, assessments made in 
relation to other surveillance technologies.  
 
AFR Locate was compared by the Appellant to police retention of biometric 
fingerprint and DNA data from anyone arrested, regardless of whether they were 
charged or convicted. That was held unlawful by the European Court of Human 
Rights because it is unnecessary in a democratic society in the case of S v United 
Kingdom.24 Once the issue of necessity was decided, the question of ‘in accordance 
with the law’ was not considered. Against this SWP drew an analogy with the case of 
R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers,25 in which the police’s common law power 
to collect, retain, and use personal data concerning individuals who had attended 
                                                 
22 R (Wood) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2010] WLR 123, [2009] 4 All ER 951 at [53]. 
23 ibid.  
24 S v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50. 
25 R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers [2015] 2 All ER 727 
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public protests – the so-called ‘extremism database’ – was held to be in accordance 
with the law by Lord Sumption, giving judgment in the Supreme Court.26  
 
For the Court of Appeal, AFR Locate lies somewhere between the two. The Court 
notes the following features:  
 
86. First, AFR is a novel technology. 
87. Secondly, it involves the capturing of the images and processing of digital 
information of a large number of members of the public, in circumstances in 
which it is accepted that the vast majority of them will be of no interest 
whatsoever to the police. 
88. Thirdly, it is acknowledged by all concerned that this is "sensitive" personal 
data, within the meaning of the DPA 2018. That Act in turn reflects EU 
legislation. This represents an institutional recognition of the sensitivity of the 
data concerned, a feature which is not present for example for ordinary 
photographs. 
89. Fourthly, the data is processed in an automated way.27  
 
On this basis the Court of Appeal finds two ‘fundamental deficiencies’ with the 
existing legal framework, which it refers to as the ‘who question’ and the ‘where 
                                                 
26 n 1 above, at [65], [79]-[80]. The Court of Appeal notes at [81] that the European Court of Human 
Rights disagreed with the proportionality assessment of the UK Supreme Court, finding that the 
surveillance of Mr Catt constituted a disproportionate violation of Article 8 in Catt v United Kingdom 
[2019] ECHR 76.  
27 n 1 above, at [86]-[89]. 
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question’: it does not make clear who may be placed on the watchlist, nor does it 
delimit where it can be lawfully deployed.28 The Privacy Impact Assessment 
produced by SWP states that the watchlist could contain information pertaining to 
‘persons wanted on suspicion for an offence, wanted on warrant, vulnerable persons 
and other persons where intelligence is required’.29 The first three of these categories 
the Court of Appeal finds to be ‘objective’, but the final category ‘could cover anyone 
who is of interest to the police. In our judgement, that leaves too broad a discretion 
vested in the individual police officer to decide who should go onto the watchlist.’30 
The ‘where question’ is not addressed at all in existing law or guidance. In effect, ‘the 
range is very broad and without apparent limits’.31  
 
The Court also prescribes a third element: a requirement to delete all data pertaining 
to persons who are scanned but not matched by the system. In SWP’s AFR Locate trial 
this was a technical process. It must become a legal requirement: 
We would hope that that feature of the current scheme would not simply be set 
out in a policy document by way of description but that it would be made clear 
that such automatic and almost instantaneous deletion is required for there to 
be an adequate legal framework for the use of AFR Locate.32 
 
                                                 
28 ibid at [91], [104], [118]-[120]. 
29 ibid at [123]. 
30 ibid at [124]. 
31 ibid at [130]. 
32 ibid at [93]. 
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The second ground concerning proportionality is addressed by the Court of Appeal 
notwithstanding the fact that the anterior finding of ‘not in accordance with the law’ 
was itself sufficient to dispose of the Article 8 issue. It raises an important question. 
The Appellant argued that the Divisional Court erred in law because it is necessary to 
consider the impact of AFR Locate not only on the appellant’s individual rights but 
on the rights of all the members of the public captured by the system. In its judgment 
the Court of Appeal rejects this argument for two reasons. The first is procedural – the 
original claim for judicial review referred to the Appellant’s rights alone.33 More 
significantly, the Court goes on to hold that the impact on other members of the public: 
 
was as negligible as the impact on the Appellant’s Article 8 rights. An impact 
that has very little weight cannot become weightier simply because other 
people were also affected. It is not a question of simple multiplication. The 
balancing exercise which the principle of proportionality requires is not a 
mathematical one; it is an exercise which calls for judgement.34  
 
On the third ground, the Court of Appeal agrees with the Appellant that the Data 
Protection Impact Assessment prepared by SWP is deficient for the purposes of 
section 64 of the DPA 2018. This inevitably follows from the finding that the 
deployment was ‘not in accordance with the law’ for the purposes of Article 8(2). As 
a consequence of the finding that the existing legal framework grants an 
impermissibly wide discretion to police officers in deciding who to place on the 
                                                 
33 ibid at [142]. 
34 ibid at [143]. 
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watchlist and where the system can be deployed, it follows that the DPIA necessarily 
fails to properly assess the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects and to set 
out measures that could mitigate such risks.35 
 
The fourth ground concerned an alleged error of law in the Divisional Court’s decision 
not to make any finding on whether or not the content of the SWP Policy Document 
on AFR Locate was sufficiently detailed to comply with section 42 of the DPA 2018. 
The document was prepared in November 2018, but the Information Commissioner 
did not issue guidance on what a section 42 Policy Document ought to contain until 
November 2019. SWP updated the Policy Document accordingly. Given that the 
guidance from the Information Commissioner determined both the ability of SWP to 
issue a suitable Policy Document and the courts’ ability to evaluate it, the approach of 
the Divisional Court is upheld.36  
 
The final ground concerned the PSED under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.37 
The Divisional Court held it was unnecessary for SWP to consider whether the 
technology was indirectly discriminatory because there was no positive evidence to 
suggest that the facial recognition software was biased along lines of race or sex. Citing 
the principles set out with authority in the case of R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions,38 the Court of Appeal emphasises that the PSED is a positive and 
continuing duty. It requires public authorities to proactively consider the potential 
                                                 
35 ibid at [153]. 
36 ibid at [160]-[161]. 
37 ibid at [167]. 
38 R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, [2014] Eq LR 60, at [26]. 
 15 
outcomes of a given measure, and to seek out relevant material regarding potential 
discriminatory effects by actively consulting with relevant groups where the material 
is not available. The Divisional Court’s finding that the absence of positive evidence 
of bias leading to indirect discrimination means that the issue need not have been 
considered is to ‘put the cart before the horse’.39 While the Divisional Court had been 
content with SWP’s submissions that it was reviewing the operation of the system 
against the requirements of section 149 on an ongoing basis as part of the technological 
trial, the Court of Appeal explicitly rejects this approach: 
The PSED does not differ according to whether something is a trial process or 
not. If anything, it could be said that, before or during the course of a trial, it is 
all the more important for a public authority to acquire relevant information in 
order to conform to the PSED and, in particular, to avoid indirect 
discrimination on racial or gender grounds.40 
 
Instead, any police force planning to use an AFR system must first ‘satisfy themselves 
that everything reasonable which could be done had been done in order to make sure 
that the software used does not have a racial or gender bias’.41  
 
Constraining mass surveillance 
 
                                                 
39 n 1 above, at [182]. 
40 ibid at [200]. 
41 ibid at [201]. 
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Automatic facial recognition is one of the most controversial products of the rapid rise 
in machine learning technologies. It is a potential tool of mass surveillance. As 
Foucault observed, governmental technologies are never simply oppressive. They are 
productive, and liberal governmentality is an exercise in balancing productive power 
against its counter-productive risks.42 The productive potential of facial recognition 
technology is well known. It allows a face to function as an individual identifier in a 
wide array of uses. For example, it comes as standard on smartphones, which store 
biometric scans for use as cryptographic keys, allowing users to unlock devices or 
authorise transactions by glancing at the device. It is used widely on social media 
platforms, as when Facebook suggests who might be present in a photograph, 
simultaneously gaining data on users’ interests and social lives.43 In short, it grants 
smooth access to digital systems. Its potential risks as a surveillance tool are also well-
known. For instance, following the Black Lives Matter protests that erupted across the 
United States in the summer of 2020, IBM announced it was abandoning the face 
recognition business, explicitly opposing its use for mass surveillance and racial 
profiling.44  
 
This judgment places four important limits on the discretion of police in using facial 
recognition systems. First, the Court ‘hopes’ that the technical feature by which non-
                                                 
42 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, tr. 2007) 333-361. 
43 ‘What is the face recognition setting on Facebook and how does it work?’ (Facebook, 2020) available 
at https://www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081  
44 A. Hern, ‘IBM quits facial-recognition market over police racial-profiling concerns’ (9th June 2020) 
The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/09/ibm-quits-facial-recognition-
market-over-law-enforcement-concerns. Critics note that IBM was already relatively far behind its 
competitors in this market.  
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matched faces are deleted from the system becomes a normative rule. Automatic 
deletion is a key reason why the impact on Mr Bridges was deemed proportionate. 
AFR cannot be deployed to simply make a record of all the faces that passed through 
the targeted area. The implication of this is that for the Court, the processing of an 
unmatched face is a passive function of software; an intrusion on privacy so minimal 
as to be practically hypothetical. On this view, human rights are only materially 
affected if one is flagged up by the system as a potential match. The check by a human 
operator is regarded as a safeguard of privacy. No rights are materially impacted by 
the system until a police officer has confirmed the match is likely true and has decided 
on the appropriate course of action. It is argued below that this finding is constructed 
on a restrictive view of individual rights that inverts the logic of AFR and wilfully 
ignores considering its potentiality. 
 
Second, and by implication of the previous point, the ‘who question’ governs all 
legally actionable decisions produced by the system. The law thus requires that there 
be an objective anterior legal justification for adding someone to the watchlist. 
Consequently, it would be unlawful to use AFR for prospective intelligence-gathering. 
Although the Court does not say so, it seems that the same requirement should apply 
by analogy to retrospective systems like AFR Identify, used by SWP to analyse footage 
of suspects drawn from existing CCTV networks, of which the UK has a vast number. 
The Court does not, perhaps understandably in this case, engage with the ongoing 
legal and political arguments as to whose biometric data is or should be retained in 
the Police National Database, how that data is handled and processed, and whether 
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or not it is deleted in accordance with the law. Inevitably the question of what 
necessary and proportionate police practices look like in a democratic society is a 
politically contested question, and one in which the UK consistently favours strong 
police powers.45 
 
Third, the ‘where’ question means there must be anterior normative reason for 
deploying AFR in a given location. As with deletion of faces, this turns a technical 
limitation into a legal rule. It prevents police from unilaterally deploying live AFR 
systems broadly; for instance, across existing city-wide networks of CCTV cameras – 
again, an important point in the closely monitored public spaces of the UK. Yet 
precisely how a geographical area may be selected for deployment of AFR systems 
remains open and undefined.  
 
Fourth, the PSED explicitly requires that software is checked for bias in advance of 
deployment. This should incentivise commercial developers of AFR technology to 
actually demonstrate that their algorithms produce consistently accurate results 
regardless of sex or race. This is a problem with AFR that has received much attention. 
A 2018 study by MIT and Stanford found an error rate of nought point eight per cent 
for light-skinned men and thirty-seven point four per cent for dark-skinned women.46 
                                                 
45 Consider the recent ruling against the UK in Gaughran v United Kingdom (45245/15) [2020] 2 WLUK 
607; Times, April 22, 2020 (ECHR); see also the findings in Current and future uses of biometric data and 
technologies HC 734 (2015) 3; and Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System (2019, The Law Society of 
England and Wales) 41.  
46 L. Hardesty. ‘Study finds gender and skin-type bias in commercial artificial-intelligence systems’ 
(11th February 2018) MIT News https://www.media.mit.edu/articles/study-finds-gender-and-skin-
type-bias-in-commercial-artificial-intelligence-systems/  
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A December 2019 report from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
surveyed one hundred and eighty-nine commercial algorithms from ninety-nine 
different developers and found similar disparities.47 The biases arise primarily from 
the manner in which neural networks that generate the algorithms are designed, and 
from the datasets on which they are ‘trained’.48 The Court heard evidence that the 
manufacturer of the NeoFace Watch software was unwilling to allow Mr Bridge’s 
expert witness on facial recognition to inspect their software, citing commercial 
confidentiality. The Court makes clear that such concerns cannot excuse a public 
authority from its obligations under the Equality Act 2010.49 Thus the need for public 
accountability trumps concerns over intellectual property. On this authority, all 
suppliers of algorithmic systems that perform governmental functions and which 
could potentially have a disproportionate impact on any line of differentiation 
covered by the Equality Act 2010 must open up the code to inspection. By the same 
token, government must ensure it has access to the expertise needed to objectively and 
effectively analyse any such programme for bias. 
 
Liberty, the organisation which supported Mr Bridges in his case, is campaigning for 
a total ban on facial recognition.50 That is a political position. As it stands, the 
judgment paves the way for the expansion of AFR within a defined legal framework. 
                                                 
47 P. Grother, M. Ngan, K. Hanaoka, ‘Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) 
Part 3: Demographic Effects’ (NISTIR 8280, December 2019) available at 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf.  
48 ibid, 2.  
49 n 1 above, at [199]. 
50 Liberty, ‘Resist Facial Recognition‘ https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/campaign/resist-
facial-recognition/.  
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While the principles enunciated by the Court of Appeal will ensure that the majority 
of the population will not be affected by AFR policing systems, it makes it acutely 
important to critically investigate how the ‘objective’ selection of watchlist targets and 
targeted areas intersects with, and intensifies, existing policing practices and 
databases. We should consider, for instance, who is affected when the watchlist is 
populated by protestors held on the ‘extremism database’, or with Home Office 
biometric data gathered from migrants and refugees. We should consider what 
happens when the ‘where question’ is answered by predictive algorithms purporting 
to predict where crime shall occur. Such algorithms work on data derived from past 
policing practices, reproducing and reifying existing biases.51 If the majority are 
spared the dystopia of a generalised digital panopticon, it must not be at the expense 
of allowing minorities and marginalised communities to be subjected to intensified 




There are two ways in which the judgment may hinder the future challenges to AFR 
which will inevitably arise. The first is, as mentioned, the refusal to consider that 
interference with privacy is more concerning when it is applied simultaneously to 
large groups than to individuals. As the Court puts it, ‘An impact that has very little 
weight cannot become weightier simply because other people were also affected’.52 
                                                 
51 H. Couchman, ‘Policing by Machine: Predictive Policing and the Threat to Our Rights’, Liberty, 
January 2019, available at https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/policing-by-machine/.  
52 n 1 above, at [143].  
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This may be true within the strictures of a positive system of individual rights, but it 
is obviously inadequate when confronting technologies that operate on the principle 
that individuals are simply elements within a larger population. It is the population, 
or segments thereof, that is placed under surveillance by AFR Locate. Targets emerge 
from the surveillance of the population on the basis of statistical analysis. When one 
enters a zone under AFR, whether one knows it or not, one becomes a potential target. 
That the processing has no direct impact does not lessen this potential impact. Being 
aware of such a potential in itself has a chilling effect, as long recognised by the law 
in relation to covert surveillance. The effect may indeed seem small on an individual 
but cumulatively it takes effect at the level of the population. This notion may be novel 
to the courts, but it is a point that has been persistently and persuasively made by 
scholars.53 Privacy as an emergent social good should not be excluded from 
consideration in advance by cleaving to an individualistic model of rights. When 
considered at the level of the population rather than the individual, the question of 
whether or not the use of AFR is at all ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the 
purposes of Article 8 may take on a different aspect.  
 
The second, related, hindrance is the Court’s refusal to adopt the dissenting judgment 
of Lord Kerr JSC in Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions, as the Appellant suggested. 
Lord Kerr said that: ‘A power on which there are insufficient legal constraints does 
                                                 
53 For recent overviews of the challenges that algorithmic governance makes to existing legal categories, 
see Kosta, E. ‘Algorithmic state surveillance: Challenging the notion of agency in human rights’ (2020) 
Regulation and Governance <doi:10/ghhv2f> (electronic pre-print); Edwards, L. and Veale, M., ‘Slave 
to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to an Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For’ 
(2017) 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 18 <doi:10/gdxthj>.  
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not become legal simply because those who may have resort to it exercise self-
restraint. It is the potential reach of the power rather than its actual use by which its 
legality must be judged’.54 The Court instead holds that only the facts of the present 
case count, and that it is not ‘necessary or helpful to consider hypothetical scenarios 
which may arise in the future’.55 Respectfully, this is not an answer to Lord Kerr’s 
point. Potentiality is not hypothetical, nor is it the opposite of a fact. Rather it is a 
quality latent in the arrangement of things in the present. It is already here, included 
in the facts as they stand. By opposing potentiality to actuality, the Court narrows the 
epistemological horizon of the law in relation to new technologies and constrains 




                                                 
54 Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] UKSC 49, [2016] AC 88 [102].  
55 n 1 above, at [60].  
